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ANALYST FORECASTS IN NEW ZEALAND 
Stephen J. Ciccone*, Ahmad Etebari**
Abstract
This study explores analyst annual earnings forecasts in New Zealand. The results show 
that forecasts of New Zealand firms do not suffer from the pessimistic biases found in studies of 
forecasts for United States firms. Similar to United States studies, however, loss firm forecasts are 
significantly less accurate and more optimistic. These results suggest that New Zealand firms do 
not tend to manage earnings to beat expectations, but poorly performing firms might attempt to 
deceive investors by decreasing the quality of their information environment. Furthermore, opti-
mism does appear to be impounded in stock prices, as firms with optimistic forecasts underper-
form firms with pessimistic forecasts by about 30%. 
Key words: analysts, forecasts, New Zealand, behavioral finance.
Jel Classification: G14, G15, G24. 
1. Introduction 
Analysts’ earnings forecast properties in the United States are extensively analyzed in 
many studies. These studies examine a wide range of issues including trends in forecast error, 
trends in forecast optimism, differences in the forecasts of profit and loss firms, and the relation-
ship between forecasts and stock returns. For example, analyst forecasts became more accurate and 
more pessimistic in the 1990s (e.g., Brown, 2001; Matsumoto, 2002). In addition, loss firm fore-
casts were found to be considerably less accurate than profit firm forecasts (e.g., Butler and 
Saraoglu, 1999). Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) find that firms with higher dispersion in 
their forecasts have lower stock returns. 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate analyst earnings forecasts of New Zealand firms 
to find if these forecasts have similarities to forecasts of United States firms. Although several 
international studies examine forecast properties in the context of country-level corporate govern-
ance structures, (e.g., Chang, Palepu, and Khanna, 2000; Hope, 2003), relatively few look within a 
country at firm-level determinants. New Zealand is a particularly interesting country to study be-
cause its financial markets are well-developed for a relatively small country, and its legal and ac-
counting regulatory governance structures are of a quality similar to those in the United States. 
This study specifically analyzes three important issues: 1) trends in forecast error and optimism, 2) 
differences between profit and loss firm forecasts, and 3) the extent to which forecast optimism is 
impounded into stock prices. 
The first issue, trends in forecast properties, is particularly important because in the 
United States the finding of a shift from optimistic forecasts to pessimistic forecasts is troubling to 
both academics and practitioners. Both groups claim that firms play an “earnings game”, managing 
earnings toward certain target numbers to reap various benefits: increased stock prices, favorable 
publicity, and management bonuses. The earnings game is often considered dangerous. When 
played, long-term prospects are sacrificed by concern with short-term profits. Corporate decisions 
are altered, accounting rules are stretched, and investors lose faith in both financial statements and 
stock prices (Collingwood, 2001). Several academic studies directly examine earnings games. For 
example, Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) find that firms manage earnings to report prof-
its, show increasing earnings, and beat the analyst forecasts. Matsumoto (2002) extends this argu-
ment, believing that firms guide analysts toward certain targets and then beat the target, thus ex-
plaining the increase in forecast pessimism. 
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The second issue, loss versus profit firm forecasts, is related to determinants of forecast 
properties. In the United States, forecasts are related to size and book-to-market ratio, among other 
items. However, even after controlling for certain firm-level characteristics, profitability is, by far, 
the strongest single predictor of forecast properties: loss firms have significantly greater disper-
sion, error, and optimism (e.g., Butler and Saraoglu, 1999; Brown, 2001; Ciccone, 2001). This 
finding raises concern if managers of loss firms are manipulating the information environment in 
an effort to fool analysts and investors. In such a scenario, not only are investors fooled and market 
efficiency hindered, but managerial insiders may profit directly through well-timed insider trades. 
The last issue, the extent to which optimism is impounded into stock prices, evaluates 
whether behavioral dimensions play a role in financial markets. Ciccone (2003) and Doukas, Kim, 
and Pantzalis (2005) find optimism to be a component of stock returns in the United States. As the 
stock return data currently available to us for New Zealand are not considered complete enough, 
the results presented herein on this topic represent a first-pass exploration. We expect to have up-
dated results from a more complete data set in the near future.  
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the data and empirical methods used. 
Section 3 presents and analyzes the results. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Data and Empirical Methods 
The forecast data are obtained from the International Brokers Estimate System (IBES) in-
ternational summary files. Annual data during the month of the fiscal year end are used for all 
forecast computations. Forecast error is computed as the absolute value of the difference between 
actual earnings and mean forecasted earnings, divided by absolute actual earnings. To alleviate 
small denominator issues, if the denominator is less than 0.05 NZD, it is set to 0.05. A forecast is 
considered optimistic if the mean forecast is greater than the actual earnings and pessimistic oth-
erwise. Profitability is based on IBES earnings, which may be different from earnings under 
GAAP. A loss is defined as when earnings are below zero. A profit is defined as when earnings are 
greater than or equal to zero. Although the forecast error and optimism are determined by using 
mean forecasts, the results are qualitatively similar if median forecasts are used instead.
Datex and Datastream databases were used to obtain the various control variables and 
stock return data. Size is computed as prices times shares outstanding. Book-to-market is com-
puted as book value divided by size. These are computed at the beginning of the fiscal year. An-
nual stock returns are computed from fiscal period beginning to fiscal period end. 
The sample period extends from 1988 through 2002. The final sample contains 946 firm-
year observations, an average of 63 observations per year. However, not all observations have a 
complete set of return data or control variables available. Caution must be used when interpreting 
the stock return results as the sample size is not large. See the individual tables for the number of 
observations used. 
3. Results 
Table 1 presents forecast error, the proportion of firms with optimistic forecasts, and the 
proportion of firms with losses for each sample year. Unlike United States studies, which show a 
strong decreasing trend in error, forecast error significantly increases in the “Late” sample period. 
Despite the increase, overall there is little discernible trend. Mean forecast error in 2001 is greater 
than mean forecast error in 1988. 
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Table 1 
Trends in Forecast Error, Forecast Optimism, and Losses 
Year Error Optimism Loss 
1988 0.3592 0.5652 0.0370 
1989 0.3617 0.7778 0.0833 
1990 0.3336 0.5094 0.0377 
1991 0.1643 0.3958 0.0833 
1992 0.2128 0.4211 0.0351 
1993 0.1686 0.4848 0.1061 
1994 0.2302 0.5455 0.0519 
1995 0.1988 0.4419 0.0349 
1996 0.1674 0.4557 0.0253 
1997 0.1926 0.4507 0.0141 
1998 0.2913 0.4865 0.0946 
1999 0.6319 0.5072 0.0870 
2000 0.2275 0.5000 0.0735 
2001 0.4326 0.5672 0.1194 
2002 0.3084 0.4082 0.0612 
    
Full (1988-2002) 0.2799  0.4937 0.0645 
Early (1988-1995) 0.2414  0.5032 0.0618 
Late (1996-2002) 0.3179  0.4843 0.0671 
Difference (Late-Early) 0.0765** -0.0189 0.0053 
    
Number of observations 946 946 946 
This table reports mean forecast error and the proportion of firms with optimistic forecasts and 
losses by year during the 1988 through 2002 sample period. Forecast error is defined as the absolute value of 
the actual earnings less the mean forecast divided by absolute actual earnings. Forecast optimism occurs 
when the mean forecast is greater than the corresponding actual earnings. A loss occurs when Street earnings 
from IBES are less than zero. The early sample period is defined as 1988 through 1995; the late sample pe-
riod is defined as 1996 through 2002. The ***, **, or * indicate the difference is statistically significant with 
99%, 95%, or 90% confidence, respectively. 
The trend in optimism also stands in contrast to United States studies. There is no trend in 
optimism in New Zealand. Not only are the “Early” and “Late” sample periods insignificantly dif-
ferent, but as in error, the optimism in 2001 is nearly the same as the optimism in 1988. 
The proportion of loss firms is shown for comparative purposes. United States studies 
find a close relationship among forecast error, optimism, and losses. The proportion of loss firms 
fluctuates widely from year to year, but no discernible trend exists. 
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Table 2 
Trends in Forecast Error, Forecast Optimism, and Losses 
 Profit Firms Loss Firms 
Year Error Optimism Error Optimism 
1988 0.1641 0.5238 2.4078 1.0000 
1989 0.3438 0.7576 0.5583 1.0000 
1990 0.2794 0.4902 1.7180 1.0000 
1991 0.0661 0.3636 1.2453 0.7500 
1992 0.1962 0.4000 0.6700 1.0000 
1993 0.0932 0.4576 0.8039 0.7143 
1994 0.1328 0.5616 2.0095 0.2500 
1995 0.1545 0.4458 1.4367 0.3333 
1996 0.1555 0.4416 0.6225 1.0000 
1997 0.1936 0.4571 0.1240 0.0000 
1998 0.1784 0.4478 1.3719 0.8571 
1999 0.4741 0.4603 2.2890 1.0000 
2000 0.1863 0.4603 0.7456 1.0000 
2001 0.3413 0.5424 1.1063 0.7500 
2002 0.2237 0.3696 1.6077 1.0000 
     
Full (1988-2002) 0.2076  0.4723  1.3298 0.8033 
Early (1988-1995) 0.1686  0.4886  1.3451 0.7241 
Late (1996-2002) 0.2461  0.4562  1.3159 0.8750 
Difference (Late-Early) 0.0775*** -0.0324 -0.0292  0.1509* 
     
Number of Observations 885 885 61 61 
This table reports mean forecast error and the proportion of firms with optimistic forecasts by profit 
and loss subsamples during the 1988 through 2002 sample period. Forecast error is defined as the absolute 
value of the actual earnings less the mean forecast divided by absolute actual earnings. Forecast optimism 
occurs when the mean forecast is greater than the corresponding actual earnings. A loss occurs when Street 
earnings from IBES are less than zero. A profit occurs when Street earnings from IBES are greater than or 
equal to zero. The early sample period is defined as 1988 through 1995; the late sample period is defined as 
1996 through 2002. The ***, **, or * indicate the difference is statistically significant with 99%, 95%, or 
90% confidence, respectively. 
Table 2 presents forecast error and optimism after separating firms into profit and loss 
subsamples. Consistent with United States forecast studies, loss firms have considerably higher 
forecast error and optimism. For example, over the entire sample, loss firm forecast error is higher 
by 1.1222 (difference not tabulated) or six times that of the profit firms. The difference is statisti-
cally significant with 99% confidence. Approximately 80% of loss firms have optimistic forecasts 
compared with a little less than 50% for profit firms. Profit firm forecasts are virtually unbiased 
over the sample period, which contrasts with the strong pessimistic bias of profit firms found in 
United States studies. As in Table 1, the forecast error and optimism do not show clearly discerni-
ble trends. 
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Table 3 
Statistics by Forecast and Earnings Characteristics 
Forecast Error  
Low Medium High Difference 
(L – H) 
Forecast Error 0.0135 0.0815 0.7464 -0.7329*** 
Forecast Optimism 0.3730 0.4840 0.6254 -0.2524*** 
Size 902.01 673.59 749.20 152.81 
Book-to-Market 0.4426 0.3156 0.4366 0.0060 
Proportion of Loss Firms 0.0188 0.0192 0.1556 -0.1368*** 
Contemporaneous Annual Return 0.2337 0.3749 0.1738 0.0599 
Subsequent Annual Return     
 Forecast Optimism  
 Pessimistic  Optimistic Difference 
(O – P) 
Forecast Error 0.1314  0.4323 -0.3009*** 
Size 798.14  759.82 38.32 
Book-to-Market 0.3259  0.4735 -0.1476* 
Proportion of Loss Firms 0.0251  0.1049 -0.0798*** 
Contemporaneous Annual Return 0.4115  0.1064 0.3051*** 
Subsequent Annual Return     
 Profitability  
 Profit  Loss Difference 
(P – L) 
Forecast Error 0.2076  1.3298 -1.1222*** 
Forecast Optimism 0.4723  0.8033 -0.3310*** 
Size 789.84  570.78 219.06 
Book-to-Market 0.3029  0.6767 -0.3738*** 
Contemporaneous Annual Return 0.3104  -0.2541 0.5645*** 
Subsequent Annual Return     
This table reports mean statistics after separating firms into subsamples based on forecast error, 
forecast optimism, and profitability. Forecast error is defined as the absolute value of the actual earnings less 
the mean forecast divided by absolute actual earnings. Forecast optimism occurs when the mean forecast is 
greater than the corresponding actual earnings. A loss occurs when Street earnings from IBES are less than 
zero. Size is defined as prices times shares. Book-to-market is defined as the book value of equity divided by 
size. Contemporaneous annual stock returns are computed from the beginning to the end of the fiscal year of 
the forecast period. Subsequent annual returns are computed from the beginning to the end of the fiscal year 
subsequent to the forecast period. The ***, **, or * indicate the difference is statistically significant with 
99%, 95%, or 90% confidence, respectively. 
Table 3 shows various statistics after sorting firms into subsamples based on forecast error 
(three portfolios), optimism, and profitability. The table confirms the previous results. Firms with 
higher forecast error have greater amounts of forecast optimism and losses. The size control variable 
does not appear to affect forecast error, optimism, or profitability. Firms with optimistic forecasts do 
tend to have higher book-to-market suggesting an association between optimism and value firms. 
This relationship might be obscured by profitability, as loss firms also tend to be value firms.  
The results so far suggest the same close relationship between forecast error, optimism, 
and losses in New Zealand as in the United States. However, as other variables such as book-to-
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market may distort this relationship, a regression framework is employed. Table 4 presents the 
results of a regression analysis using forecast error and optimism as dependent variables. The 
models control for the influence of size, book-to-market, and contemporaneous stock returns. 
Forecast error, a loss dummy variable, and an optimism dummy variable are also included where 
applicable. Three time periods are examined: the full sample period (1988-2002), an early subpe-
riod (1988-1995), and a late subperiod (1996-2002). 
Table 4 
Regressions using Forecast Error and Forecast Optimism as Dependent Variables 













Intercept  0.16 0.17  0.13 -0.55 -1.38 -0.02 
 (2.52)** (2.59)*** (1.17) (2.50) (6.83)*** (0.00) 
Log (Size) -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 0.03 0.18 -0.07 
 (-1.22) (-2.02)** (-0.59) (0.19) (3.46)* (0.76) 
Book-to-Market 0.00 -0.01 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.12 
 (-0.19) (-1.40) (1.16) (0.79) (0.77) (0.28) 
Loss 0.64 0.80 0.49 -0.00 -0.78 0.38 
 (3.72)*** (1.79)* (2.66)*** (0.00) (0.58) (0.30) 
Contemporaneous 
Return
 0.01 -0.00  0.01 -0.33 -0.22 -0.33 
 (1.35) (-0.07) (1.21) (4.98)** (0.56) (3.32)* 
Error    1.95 3.78 1.56 
    (19.44)*** (7.88)*** (10.34)*** 
Optimism 0.22 0.22 0.21    
 (4.97)*** (3.45)*** (3.56)***    
Number of
observations
513 209 304 513 209 304 
F-Statistic 15.71*** 8.28*** 8.32***    
R
2
 (adjusted) 0.13 0.15 0.11    
Likelihood Ratio    53.47*** 26.50*** 34.13*** 
Pseudo R
2
 (max)    0.13 0.16 0.14 
This table presents the results of OLS regression models explaining forecast error and logistical regres-
sion models explaining forecast optimism. Variable definitions are as in Table 3. The loss dummy variable is 
equal to 1 when earnings are below zero and equal to 0 otherwise. The optimism dummy variable is equal to 1 if 
the mean forecast is greater than actual earnings and equal to 0 otherwise. Three subperiods are tested. Full is the 
entire 1988 through 2002 sample period. Early is from 1988 through 1995. Late is from 1996 through 2002. 
White’s (1980) correction is used to compute t-statistics for the OLS regressions. The ***, **, or * indicate the 
coefficient is statistically significant with 99%, 95%, or 90% confidence, respectively. 
Forecast error is significantly related to two variables during each test period: loss and op-
timism. Firms with losses and optimistic forecasts have larger forecast errors. Perhaps surprisingly, 
size is not significant in the full and late sample periods, while book-to-market is never significant. 
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Forecast optimism is significantly related to forecast error as firms with greater error have 
greater amounts of optimism. Including forecast error in the regression eliminates the significance 
of losses. When error is excluded, loss is a significant variable in all test periods (not tabulated). 
Optimism is also related to contemporaneous stock returns in the full sample period and in the late 
sample period. Firms with lower returns have greater amounts of forecast optimism. 
The last set of analyses examines the relation of stock returns and optimism. The analysis 
starts on Table 3, which includes contemporaneous stock returns with the test variables. Contem-
poraneous returns are computed from the beginning of fiscal year of the forecast period to the end 
of that fiscal year. Thus, the returns do not represent excess returns from a viable trading strategy, 
but do indicate the extent to which optimism is impounded in stock prices. 
Firms with optimistic forecasts underperform versus firms with pessimistic forecasts by 
about 30% suggesting the possibility that investors do impound the optimistic expectations into the 
stock prices. As investors are disappointed, the stock returns are lower. However, this observation 
might be related to losses. Firms with losses underperform firms with profits by over 50%. 
To control for the influence of other variables, a regression model is specified using con-
temporaneous stock returns as the dependent variable and size, book-to-market, loss and optimism 
dummy variables, and forecast error as independent variables. These results are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5 





Contemporaneous Return  
Late
Intercept 0.18 0.22 0.39 
 (1.16) (1.80) (1.25) 
Log (Size) 0.04 -0.00 0.04 
 (1.54) (-0.02) (0.86) 
Book-to-Market -0.00 0.00 -0.13 
 (0.00) (0.07) (-1.32) 
Loss -0.53 -0.40 -0.44 
 (-4.98)*** (-2.38)** (-2.36)** 
Forecast Error 0.09 -0.00 0.13 
 (1.77)* (-0.07) (1.87)* 
Optimism -0.29 -0.08 -0.41 
 (-2.65)*** (-1.16) (-2.29)** 
Number of observations 513 209 304 
F-Statistic 2.33** 1.25 1.72 
R
2
 (adjusted) 0.02 0.01 0.01 
This table presents the results of OLS regression models explaining contemporaneous stock returns. 
Variable definitions are as in Table 3. The loss dummy variable is equal to 1 when earnings are below zero 
and equal to 0 otherwise. The optimism dummy variable is equal to 1 if the mean forecast is greater than 
actual earnings and equal to 0 otherwise. Three subperiods are tested. Full is the entire 1988 through 2002 
sample period. Early is from 1988 through 1995. Late is from 1996 through 2002. White’s (1980) correction 
is used to compute t-statistics. The ***, **, or * indicate the coefficient is statistically significant with 99%, 
95%, or 90% confidence, respectively. 
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After controlling for the variables described above, firms with optimistic forecasts exhibit 
lower stock returns in the full and late sample periods. The most important control variable is loss. 
Firms with losses have significantly lower returns in each test period. Size and book-to-market are 
not related to stock returns. These results suggest the possibility of behavioral patterns in New 
Zealand stock returns. 
4. Conclusions 
The results of this study suggest that New Zealand analyst earnings forecasts are different 
in important ways versus United States forecasts. Firms in New Zealand do not appear to be play-
ing the “earnings games” that firms in the United States play. New Zealand forecasts are virtually 
unbiased on average, and they showed no sign of becoming pessimistically biased during the sam-
ple period. However, loss firm forecasts are significantly less accurate and more optimistic. This 
result is consistent with studies of United States forecasts and might be explained by managerial 
deception as poorly performing firms attempt to manipulate their information environment. 
Although the stock return results should be interpreted with caution, optimism does ap-
pear to play a role in New Zealand stock returns. Firms with optimistic forecasts have considerably 
lower stock returns than firms with pessimistic expectations. This introduces a couple possibilities. 
Investors may simply be too optimistic about certain firms thus bidding prices up too high. More 
cynically, certain firms might be misleading investors. In either case, as the firm disappoints, the 
stock returns are lower to reduce to price to a more reasonable level.  
Future research can examine the issue in greater detail. 
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